Collusion and Commitment in Bank Bailout

Collusion and soft budget constraint are two conspicuous phenomena in transition economies¡¯ banking system. Literature has separately investigated those two phenomena from theoretical point of views. However, the cross-point of both phenomena has been neglected in the research of banking regulation. The present paper addresses this issue in a simple model of two-period contract with termination at the end of the first period. By comparing the two hierarchies -- ¡°bank-firm¡± and ¡°government-bank-firm¡±, we show that the government¡¯s non-commitment and banking bailout cause inefficiency in the contact relationship. Moreover, after introducing collusion possibility, non-commitment of the government increases the stakes, or bribes, which the collusive bank can extract, and makes it more costly for the government to implement this contract. However, taking into account the fact that the bank is collusive, the government who aims to prevent collusion will switch to the other equilibrium where she sticks to her commitment and excludes collusion from the contract relationship. Here, collusion plays a role as a hardening budget constraint device. Some policy implications are suggested at the end.soft budget constraint, collusion, moral hazard, commitment, transition, centralized economy.

Electricity Restructuring in China: The Elusive Quest for Competition

The continuation of China’s remarkable economic growth will depend on continued increases in electricity supply. China has commenced a program of electricity sector restructuring, with the announced aim of relying on markets and competition to provide incentives for attracting private investment and encouraging efficiency. However, a close examination of the generation markets being created suggests that truly free wholesale prices are likely to be both high and volatile. This may be the reason that these prices have not yet been freed – and it may not bode well for true market liberalization in the future.Electricity Restructuring, Competition, China

A Case for Affirmative Action in Competition Policy

We analyze the trade-off faced by competition authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of sites or any other non-reproducible assets. The latter represent opportunities. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which firms may differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here appears to explain why helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus.Competition policy, capacity accumulation, Cournot competition, asymmetric duopoly, regulatory consistency, differential games

Synthesis And Characterization Of Transition Metal Arsenide Nanocrystals And The Metastability And Magneto-Structural Phase Transition Behavior Of Mnas Nanocrystals

This dissertation study focuses on (1) probing the magneto-structural phase transformation in nanoscale MnAs; (2) evaluation of the size-dependent phase stability of type-B MnAs (prepared by rapid injection); and (3) developing a general synthetic method for transition metal arsenide nanoparticles. Discrete MnAs nanoparticles that adopt different structures at room temperature (type-A, α-structure and type-B, β-structure) have been prepared by the solution-phase arrested precipitation method. Atomic pair distribution and Rietveld refinement were employed on synchrotron data to explore the structural transitions of the bulk and nanoparticle samples, and these results were compared to AC magnetic susceptibility measurements of the samples. The results confirm that the structural transition and the magnetic transition are highly correlated in bulk MnAs and suggest that for type-A MnAs nanoparticles, there is a similar magneto-structural phase transition occurring in the same temperature region as that for bulk MnAs. However, for type-B MnAs nanoparticles, there is no magneto-structural phase transition, consistent with that type-B MnAs nanoparticles being kinetically trapped in the β-structure. Type-B MnAs nanoparticles adopting the β-strucuture undergo a transformation from β to α upon cooling. Temperature dependent XRD studies and magnetic measurements suggest that the TP for α → β conversion is suppressed to lower temperatures relative to bulk and type-A MnAs nanoparticles and that the transformation is reversible but has an enhanced hysteresis, which results in a large coexistence temperature range for the α and β structure. The transformation temperature correlated with the compression of the lattice parameters of the type-B MnAs nanoparticles due to the decrease in the particle size or the presence of chemical doping, or both. A new general synthetic method for transition metal arsenide (Ni11As8, FeAs and CoAs) nanocrystals synthesis was developed by directly injecting the metal precursor into pre-reacted arsenic precursors. This method enables more control of the nanoparticle growth and monodispersity than is achieved by the direct conversion of metal nanoparticles